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Does the Categorical Imperative Give Rise to a 
Contradiction in the Will?
Elijah Millgram
The Brave New World—style utilitarian dystopia is a familiar feature o f the 
cultural landscape; Kantian dystopias are harder to come by, perhaps 
because, until Rawls, Kantian morality presented itself as a primarily 
personal rather than political program. This asymmetry is peculiar for 
formal reasons, because one phase o f the deliberative process on which 
Kant insists is to ask what the world at large would be like if everyone 
did whatever it is one is thinking of doing. I do not propose to write a 
Kantian Brave New World myself, but I am going to ask, o f what these 
days is called “the Cl-procedure,” what would happen if everybody fol­
lowed it. I will argue that if the Cl-procedure works as advertised, it 
exposes a practical incoherence in the commitment to having it govern 
one’s actions: in the Kantian vocabulary that goes with the territory, 
that the Categorical Imperative gives rise to a contradiction in the will, 
(Less formally, that it is self-refuting.)
My target will be a recently influential interpretation of Kant, due 
primarily to John Rawls and a number o f his students, most promi­
nently Onora O ’Neill, Christine Korsgaard, and Barbara Herman, a 
group I will for convenience refer to as the New Kantians.1 Although it 
does draw on earlier interpretative work, this body o f writing is rela­
tively self-contained, and manageable in a way that the Kant literature 
as a whole no longer is. I don’t myself wish to take a stand on whether 
the New Kantian reading is exege tic ally correct; it suffices for present 
purposes that it has proven itself interesting, plausible, and powerful 
enough to have moved Kantian moral philosophy back from the mar­
ginalized position it occupied a little over a quarter-century ago to the 
center o f contemporary ethics.
I will begin by rehearsing the Cl-procedure and the theory that 
accompanies it; the reader is warned that the setup will take more time 
than is usual in papers o f this kind. Kant himself used the label ‘Cate­
gorical Imperative’ to mark three ideas that he thought were at bottom 
the same: the practical priority of universalizability, of respect for per­
sons, and o f autonomy. They are, however, at any rate on the surface, 
rather different, and in order to sidestep the issue o f whether the dif­
ferent versions of the Categorical Imperative are in fact equivalent, I
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will be focusing only on the first, namely, on Kant’s insistence that one 
act only according to maxims o f which one can at the same time will 
that they become universal laws.2 So the first task on our agenda will be 
describing how the New Kantians reconstruct that demand.
1.
The first formulation o f the Categorical Imperative supplies a test for 
the permissibility o f a proposed action. The New Kantians render this 
test procedurally, and have come to call it the Cl-procedure.3 When it 
occurs to you to do something, you are to
1. Identify the maxim of the action.
The maxim is the “subjective principle o f  volition” {G 400 n.) 
that underlies the action. It captures your understanding of  
the action and of why you are proposing to perform it. The 
New Kantian account depicts maxims as having something like 
a logical form:
In circumstances C, to do A, because P.
Here A is a description o f the type o f  action; C specifies the 
occasions that are to trigger actions o f type A; and P  specifies 
the point of the action.4
2. Consider the maxim universalized, that is, imagine a world (a 
“perturbed social world,” in Rawls’s phrase) in which everyone 
in your circumstances (that is, in circumstances that share with 
the one at hand the features you understand to be relevant) 
does what you are proposing to do.
If you can't do this—if such a world is literally inconceivable— 
or if the intention expressed in your maxim is bound to be 
frustrated in such a world, then your maxim fails the contradic­
tion in conception test.^
Each of the elements of a maxim plays a role in the New Kan­
tian reconstruction o f the Cl-procedure. C and A are the 
clauses o f the rule that is always acted on in the perturbed 
social world. By specifying the intended achievement, P  gives 
content to the notion o f a frustrated plan of action; if Pis frus­
trated by executing the plan, then the plan is self-frustrating.
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3, Ask whether there are intentions that you are bound to have 
simply in virtue o f being a human agent, but that cannot be 
successfully executed if your maxim is universalized.
If there are, your maxim fails the contradiction in the will test.
4. If your maxim passes both tests, you may go ahead and per­
form the action; if it does not, acting on your maxim is prohib­
ited.
What this comes to is best made clear by example, but before I get to 
that, a couple of clarificatory remarks. First, although I have described 
the procedure as something you pause to execute before going ahead 
with an action you have in mind, the Kantian requirement is o f course 
not that you stand around muttering to yourself before you do any­
thing. The procedure is meant as a rational reconstruction of the delib­
erative background to a decision properly arrived at, in pretty much 
the way that Aristotelian practical syllogisms are meant to reconstruct 
a somewhat different kind of deliberative background to action {Rawls 
2000,218).
Second, the NewKantians understand the point of the Cl-procedure 
to be practical consistency.6 The idea is that self-frustrating plans of 
action are the analogues, in practical reasoning, of the kind of incoher­
ence that contradictory beliefs amount to in theoretical reasoning. 
Uneon troversial models for such self-frustration can be found in 
means-end incoherence, as when you decide to go to New York, but 
tear up the ticket that would get you there, or (to borrow an example 
from Garry Trudeau (1996, 104)) when someone decides he should 
have gone to medical school, but that dropping out of high school was 
definitely the right choice. You cannot coherently intend a self-frustrat­
ing plan o f action, and the Cl-procedure is presented as a way of check­
ing whether what you are proposing is something that you can 
coherently intend. It is not (as such illustrious readers as John Stuart 
Mill have believed) a way of checking whether the results o f everybody 
acting as you propose would be to your liking. I will defer to another 
occasion the question of why intentions that fail the Cl-procedure are 
supposed to be on a par with self-frustrating plans; for now, we need to 
bear in mind that courses o f action with genuinely awful consequences 
can pass the Cl-procedure, which is to say that it is a deeply nonconse- 
quentialist way o f thinking about what to do. The question is: “Canyon  




Kant illustrates his proposal with four examples, and because it is 
important for the subsequent argument to have the moves clearly laid 
out, I will walk through four examples as well, construing them as the 
New Kan dans do. However, Kant’s treatment of suicide is hard to bring 
into line with the New Kantian reading (and in fact it is not easy to see 
how suicide is an appropriate example of Kant’s claims on just about 
anybody’s reading). Because we do not want to skimp on exemplary 
contradication-in-the-will arguments before proceeding to develop our 
own, I will substitute an alternative, the recent New Kantian argument 
against violence.
Lying. Suppose your maxim is: to lie about whether you can and will 
pay back your creditor, whenever you need a loan that you’re not in a 
position to repay—the point of your action being, of course, to get the 
money. If we think about a world in which everybody lied in these cir­
cumstances, we realize that in that world your plan of action could not 
possibly be effective; no creditor would believe you, and the lie would 
not work. Willing both a world in which everybody does as you do, and 
that your lie be effective, is something very much like adopting a self- 
frustrating plan (though, again, we haven’t said why you have to be 
committed to both sides of the “plan”). Therefore, lies of this type are 
stricdy impermissible. Restrictions generated by failure at the contra­
diction^ n-con cep tion stage are “perfect duties"; there are no excep­
tions to the prohibition on acting on this maxim. ?
Before moving on to the next example, I want, for reasons that will 
be apparent in the sequel, to give this one a little more discussion than 
it usually gets. Kant’s argument seems to depend on an empirical 
premise—that a practice of lying will undercut its own effectiveness— 
that is obviously often false.8 Airlines, for instance, routinely publish 
schedules that they know they cannot meet; their maxim is, roughly, 
“When it will allow us to utilize our capital more efficiently, we will 
announce schedules we can’t possibly stick to, in order to increase rev­
enue.” But {as you can confirm by looking around, the next time you 
are in an airport) passengers have not ceased to believe the schedules: 
they are surprised and upset when their flights are delayed, they have 
plans made around their flights’ scheduled arrival times, and they are 
completely unprepared when they turn out to have missed their con­
nections.® As a matter of psychological fact, people simply do not 
behave in the way that Kant’s argument says they do. There are two 
ways we might approach this problem, and I just want to indicate what 
the Kantian’s choice is. He can treat the premise as empirical, and
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reshape his moral arguments around whatever the psychological facts 
turn out to be. Or, and I am myself inclined to think that this option is 
the more Kantian in spirit, he can treat it as prescriptive: Kant is on 
about how people are supposed to reason, and not about how they actu­
ally do. A rational agent should stop believing when it is obvious that 
there is a practice of lying; and we are to draw our moral conclusions 
on that basis rather than the empirical one.10
Mutual Aid. Suppose one of your maxims is: when someone needs a 
hand, not to help out, because you have other things to do with your 
time. Now, a world in which no one helps anyone else is {at first glance) 
conceivable.11 But such a world would frustrate, not perhaps the inten­
tion expressed in the maxim, but a practical commitment you are 
bound to have to your own agency. In the Kantian picture, to be a ratio­
nal agent is to be a creature that deliberates about, settles on, and then 
pursues its own ends. You have no way of knowing, now, what ends you 
will settle on down the road.12 But you do know, humans being what 
they are, that if people are going to be agents worth the name, they will 
adopt projects that they cannot manage entirely on their own, and 
what is more, that the need for assistance crops up frequendy enough 
in situations where there are no formal arrangements for assuring and 
compensating it. I decide to move my kitchen table, and so I have to get 
someone to lift the other end. I am lost, and since what I am is lost, the 
person from whom I have to ask directions is someone I do not already 
have anything like a contractual relationship with: I will have to ask a 
stranger for a favor. A world in which no one helps out will be a world 
in which the pursuit of your ends will predictably (often but not neces­
sarily always) run aground. To will such a world is to will a world in 
which your agency is routinely frustrated, and your stake in your own 
agency is such that this would amount to a contradiction in your will. 
The “maxim of indifference" must be rejected.
Development of Talents. ‘Talent’ is here a misleadingly highfalutin 
word for the specialized skills of one kind or another that pursuing 
your ends is almost bound to require. There are many projects that you 
might reasonably adopt that would require driving to bring them off, 
and so being able to drive counts as a “talent" in the appropriate sense. 
It is an empirical but unavoidable fact about human agency that you 
yourself cannot be expected to have all the necessary skills; social 
arrangements built around the division of labor make it reasonable to 
expect that suitable resources of this kind will be available at the appro­
priate stages of your project. A world in which no one takes opportuni­
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ties to develop his talents is, at first glance, anyway, conceivable.13 But 
in such a world, those capacities are unavailable to you as resources, 
and your stake in your own agency—in the New Kantian reading, a 
kind of necessary end—is bound to be frustrated. Therefore, you can­
not will a world in which the maxim we are considering is universalized, 
and the maxim must be rejected.14
Because Kant holds that the contradiction in the last two cases is in 
the will, rather than in conception—in the New Kantian reading, that 
the plan of action is not itself self-frustrating, but that when it is taken 
together with other ends that you necessarily have, these are jointly 
mutually frustrating—he holds that it gives rise to “imperfect duties.” 
You obviously cannot develop all the useful specialized skills and capac­
ities; you obviously cannot help out every time someone needs it. The 
argument is supposed to show that you have to help sometimes, and that 
you have to develop some skill set; but just when to help and when not 
to is left up to you, and which talents to develop is also left up to you.15
Violence-1® Suppose your maxim is to take violent means, and in par­
ticular to kill, when that will promote your interests and projects. Being 
a victim of violence generally, and being killed in particular, tends to 
interrupt one’s plan of action. {There are odd exceptions—for 
instance, when being bludgeoned to death is actually part of your 
plan.)17 In a world in which everyone acted on this maxim, your agency 
in general would be ineffective because interrupted, and whatever 
project you are currently pursuing via the maxim would be interrupt- 
able.1® That your current project be interrupted (or anyway interrupt- 
able by anyone else in pursuit of their ends), or that your agency 
generally be aborted or abortive, is not something you can coherendy 
will. The violence-endorsing maxim must be rejected.
Notice a few features of New Kantian applications of the Cl-proce­
dure that turn on contradiction in the will (that is, of the latter three 
examples). First, they exploit deep facts about specifically human 
agency—about the range of ends that it is reasonable to expect humans 
to adopt, about the inability of human beings to do everything for 
themselves, or to acquire all the skills their projects are likely to need, 
and about the vulnerability of human agency to violent interruption. 
These are facts about people, not necessary features of agency. There 
might be creatures of whom none of this was true, creatures whose indi­
vidual capabilities, skill sets, and robustness extended well beyond the 
range of their reasonably adopted ends, rather than falling short of it. 
If we were characters from Road Runner, the New Kan dan argument
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against violence would not go through: when Wile E. Coyote is crushed 
under a falling rock, he emerges slightly crumpled, but still ready to 
order the next Acme product. Second, the argument does not suppose 
that all conceivable projects, or even the projects you have actually 
undertaken, will be aborted if others do not come to your aid, etc.19 If 
the argument is to work, the requirement must be rather that the world 
of the universalized maxim pose enough of an impediment to the range 
of projects that a rational deliberator—a creature that sets its own 
ends—might well adopt. And third, what drives the argument in each 
case is your stake in your own effective agency, which makes it impos­
sible for you to coherently endorse a commitment to arrangements 
that would very broadly undermine it.
2.
New Kantians are committed to actions coming in all sizes and levels of 
abstraction. And refrainings and omissions can count as actions, pro­
vided that they are governed by one’s intent in the same way that more 
obvious actions are.20 It follows that governing one’s activity by the Cl- 
procedure—that is, not performing an action if its maxim does not 
pass the Cl-procedure—is, anyway when one is “acting from the moral 
law,” itself an action or plan of action. Like other actions, it can be the 
dictate of many possible maxims, but a maxim in line with the spirit of 
(New) Kantian moral theory would be:
When I am making up my mind what to do, I will act only on max­
ims that pass the Cl-procedure, so as to make (morally or ratio­
nally) permissible decisions.
Call this the C/maxim; Kantians are committed to requiring of agents 
that something along the lines of the Cl-maxim capture their volitional 
stance.21
New Kantian moral theory imposes the Cl-procedure as a test that all 
of one’s maxims must pass. The Cl-maxim, which expresses the willing­
ness to adopt this constraint, is itself a maxim. Therefore, proceeding 
on the basis of the Cl-maxim must be contingent on its passing the Cl- 
procedure.22
The point here is not that the Cl-procedure has to show that the Cl- 
procedure is mandatory; to establish that, one would proceed by test­
ing a maxim containing the clause, “... not to act on the C I w h i c h  
is not what I propose to do. The thought is rather that because the Cl- 
procedure tests the maxims you bring to it for practical consistency,
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you do not want a maxim to fail—even if you think of it as founda­
tional.2^  (Compare: in a foundationalist epistemological structure, we 
may exempt its foundational elements from having justifications, but 
we would still have cause for complaint if their contents turned out to 
have the form p A~'p.)
I will now walk through the application of the Cl-procedure to the 
Cl-maxim; as previously announced, I will be attempting to show that 
the Cl-maxim fails at the contradiction-in-the-will stage of the proce­
dure. We have just completed the initial step of the procedure, that is, 
identifying the maxim that it is going to be run on. The next step is to 
represent the perturbed social world in which the maxim is universal­
ized, In the case of the Cl-maxim, this is a world in which all agents treat 
the Cl-procedure as a constraint on their actions. That is, they act only 
when they could will the maxim of their action to be universalized.
In willing that everyone always act in the way you are proposing, “as 
if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a univer­
sal law of nature" (G 421), you are willing that you act yourself in the 
way you are proposing, as though governed by “a universal law of 
nature”; after all, “everyone” includes yourself That is, accepting the 
Cl-maxim involves, in your own case, understanding your actions as 
governed by, or as the deliverances of, lawlike policies. (I am not just 
bearing down hard on something Kant happened to say; I will in due 
course argue that the Cl-procedure can work only if its inputs are law­
like policies.) For a policy to be lawlike is for it to have no exceptions. 
So the perturbed social world is one in which, when anyone acts, he 
understands himself to be acting from a universal and so exceptionless 
policy that governs his action.
Of course we are not supposing that agents in the perturbed social 
world act on the same policies (except for the policy expressed by the 
Cl-maxim). Agents in that world do will that others acton the same pol­
icies as themselves. But “willing” has, in one’s own case, consequences 
it does not have in others’. When I will that I act from a policy or 
according to a law, that has the effect of committing me to act (it 
amounts to an intention to act) in accordance with the policy. But 
when I ‘'will" that someone else act in accord with my policy, that need 
have no consequences for whether he does: most other people are not 
subject to my will. I also do not think we need to imagine that agents do 
not change their policies from time to time. They may decide that a 
previous policy was mistaken, and is to be replaced. What is required is 
that in so doing they understand themselves to have discarded one uni­
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versal, exceptionless policy and to have replaced it with another. Kant 
has sometimes been accused of having a moral theory that generates 
exceptionless rules {that everybody has to abide by); that was a misper­
ception of a different feature of the view, which is that it operates on 
exceptionless rules (but different ones for different agents at different 
times) 24
What this means is that the perturbed social world of the universal­
ized Cl-maxim is one in which requests for exceptions to people’s pol­
icies will be uniformly denied. We will have to proceed carefully here, 
making sure as the argument develops that we know just what this 
means. But meantime, notice that we are still on Kant’s home turf. 
Kant diagnoses the immoral person as wanting to make an exception 
for himself (G 424); but if making an exception for oneself on one’s 
own behalf is illegitimate, surely demanding that others make an 
exception for one must be illegitimate, too.
Now 1 want to advance the following claim: successful agency 
requires exceptions from others’ policies, in just the way that successful 
agency requires assistance from others, in just the way that it requires 
immunity from violence, and in just the way that it requires the avail­
ability of a rich set of skills all of which one cannot have acquired one­
self.25 If this is correct (and if the Kantian model arguments for mutual 
aid and the like work as advertised), then, by parity of argument, the 
Cl-maxim gives rise to a contradiction in the will: one’s stake in one’s 
own agency is such that one cannot endorse having it undermined by 
being deprived of the exceptions that are its precondition. And if that 
is in turn correct, then it is forbidden to act on the Cl-maxim, and Kan­
tian moral theory is (at least in its New Kantian rendition, and stating 
the conclusion informally) self-refuting.
Even though the analogous claims in the New Kantian model argu­
ments are not taken to need support, I am going to argue for this one. 
I will proceed first by giving examples of the kind of case I have in 
mind. Then I will give an argument meant to explain why cases of this 
kind are common enough to be an empirical but deep fact about 
human agency. Finally, I will take up the New Kantian’s stock objection 
to treating the cases as my argument requires—that is, to treating them 
as bona fide exceptions—and give two counterarguments to it.
Parking in Milan: I’ll change a real-life story around a little bit to get 
my first, very small-scale example. When I was visiting friends in Milan, 
I needed to run my bags up to their apartment before returning the 
rental car; I found myself on a one-way and heavily-trafficked street,
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with no on-street parking, and a barrier to keep cars off the sidewalk, 
which meant that I needed a small exception (the kind that involves 
blinking hazard lights) to the rule that governed the building’s parking 
lot: only cars with permits. As it happened, the guard staffing the lot 
wasn’t handing out exceptions, and my plans for the day had to be 
rewritten on the fly.
Trouble in High School: A former colleague of mine reports having 
been very bored in high school, and admits to frequently skipping 
classes ... so frequently, in fact, that she ought to have been kicked out 
of school. She never asked for an exception to the rule that gets you 
expelled for skipping class, but an excepdon was made: one to which 
she owes her college education, and so her currentjob, and so, indi­
rectly, much of the shape of her current life. In this example, the effect 
of not having an exception made for one is rather more dramatic than 
in the first.
The Tardy Contributor. A fellow academic who was editing a Festschrift 
had set a hard deadline for the invited papers. One of the authors cir­
culated a draft of his paper, and shortly before the deadline discovered 
a problem requiring major revisions. The editor granted an exception 
to the deadline; without it, the author would have had to withdraw the 
paper, which would have hurt the Festschrift, the feelings of its subject, 
and the author himself, who would have been hard put to find another 
venue for the commissioned piece.
Cases like these are recognizable enough (although we still need to 
take up the question of how they are to be interpreted). But are they 
common enough to make the availability of exceptions a precondition 
for successful agency? If the need for exceptions is only exceptional, it 
will not support the argument we are developing against universalizing 
the Cl-procedure. So I will now argue that exceptions will be needed 
on an ongoing basis.
Let’s begin with a fact used by other Kantian arguments that we’ve 
already reviewed: that human agency is dependent on the cooperation 
of others. Human projects are vulnerable, the kind of projects that 
human rational deliberators reasonably adopt will outrun the 
resources that an agent can muster on his own, and they will do so fre- 
quendy enough to make cooperation a sine qua non. Once again, this is 
not being introduced as a necessary truth about agency. For all we 
know, there could be agents who were successful lone wolves, either 
because projects that wolves take on fall into a narrower range than 
ours do, or because wolves are much more resourceful than we are.
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The behavior of others is a very large part of the environment in 
which we pursue our ends, and much of that behavior is policy-directed 
or rule-governed in any case; ex hypothesi, in the world of the univer­
salized Cl-maxim, all of it is. So the contribution that others make to 
our projects will (mosdy, in the actual world, and entirely, in the per­
turbed social world we are considering) come under the heading of 
rules or policies in force. So you will be able to pursue your projects 
effectively (without getting exceptions to the rules) only if policy- and 
rule-governed behavior gives you the cooperation you need. So we 
need to ask how likely that is.
It is obvious that your projects have to be chosen largely in ignorance 
of others’ rules and policies. For one thing, most people’s policies are 
unannounced. And perhaps more importantly, even if they were 
announced, no one could keep track of more than a handful of them. 
This is a special case of another empirical claim used in the Kantian 
argument for developing one’s talents: that people can’t develop all 
the capacities or skills they will need. The skill in this case is that of 
knowing what the rules of the game are; lawyers are a class of profes­
sionals who specialize in developing that skill for a smallish subset of 
the official rules of the game, and becoming competent in just such a 
small subset turns out to be a full-time occupation. In special cases, you 
may consult a specialist—a lawyer or accountant—before embarking 
on a project, but most of the time, that’s just not feasible. Because it is 
typical of interesting or important projects that one doesn’t know just 
how they will unfold, one doesn’t even know whose rules one will run 
into along the way. (This is true of not-so-in teres ting projects as well; in 
the parking example, I did not know, when I made my travel plans, that
I would have a problem leaving the car on the street.) As an agent, you 
choose your direction with only the most sketchy sense of what the 
other relevant agents’ policies are likely to be.
It is as obvious that both individuals and institutions have to formu­
late their policies and rules in ignorance, for the most part, of your 
ends. It is not just that it wouldn’t be logistically feasible to keep track 
of everyone’s ends. In the Kantian picture of rational agency, the cen­
tral feature of such agency is that you can formulate and adopt new 
ends. You yourself can’t predict what your own ends will be down the 
road (recall that the New Kantian arguments for mutual aid and for 
developing one’s talents rely on this fact); a fortiori, others cannot pre­




Since each set of decisions—about what rules and policies others 
adopt, and about what ends and projects you adopt—is made in igno­
rance of the other, the chances of their being suitably coordinated are 
very small indeed. Overall, we should not expect that others’ policies 
will, as they are, deliver the cooperation that your projects {and you) 
need from them. Therefore, a condition on the successful exercise of 
your own agency is that others make exceptions for you. It is not for 
nothing that unions use work-to-rule as a threat.26
Let me pause to address a handful of worries. First, you may be wor­
rying that parking problems and their ilk are too small to drive a criti­
cism of Kantian morality. I certainly agree that we should not reject 
Kantian moral theory because on some occasion I could not find a 
place to park, but the smallness of such examples is meant to serve as 
an icon for what the world of human agency is really like. The perva­
siveness of such small problems means that, although one can probably 
do without an exception in this or that particular case, doing without 
exceptions in all of them will make one’s remaining agency not worthy 
of the name.27
Second, you may also be worrying that the examples are not moral, or 
that the exceptions in my examples are undeserved. But the Kantian 
argument (on its New Kantian reading) is supposed to be driven by 
one’s own stake in one’s agency, and so that is what matters for the 
argument, not whether the subject matter strikes one as moral, and not 
what one does or does not deserve. Objections turning on desert and 
on what is and is not moral get the order of explanation backwards, 
because one of the great strengths of Kantian theory is that it purports 
to provide a criterion for inclusion in the subject matter of morality: to 
appeal to one's independent and prior view of what is a moral issue and 
what morality requires is to beg at least one of Kant’s questions.
Third, the argument I have been developing, like other arguments 
for imperfect duties, requires one to make judgment calls about how 
often a given type of situation arises. My own judgment call is that the 
relevant situations really do arise often enough for your agency to 
depend on exceptions granted by others (and, although I have not 
emphasized this side of the argument, exceptions to your own policies 
granted by yourself—think of a landlord granting himself an exception 
to a self-imposed rule that prohibits him from renting to dog owners). 
But if you have not been convinced, recall that the argument is mod­
eled on the Kantian arguments for mutual aid and for the develop­
ment of one’s talents; it will suffice for present purposes if one needs
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exceptions from others to roughly the same extent that one needs assis­
tance from others. This is much harder to gainsay: after all, one can go 
days or weeks at a time without needing to ask for anyone’s help. That 
is, the fallback claim is that if the model New Kantian contradiction-in- 
the-will arguments work, so does this one.
In any case, this line of resistance has an analogue discussed by Kant, 
who remarks that a well-off individual is likely to be happy to forgo the 
promise of mutual aid.2® I have noticed that those who think we do not 
need exceptions as often as all that tend to be the high-SES academics; 
that is, there is a recognizable class bias to the objection. What is more, 
even observations that cut across class lines may understate the overall 
need for exceptions, because some regions (think First World econo­
mies) accumulate excepdons at the expense of faraway and lcss-devel- 
oped parts of the world. {If the global ecosystem can’t handle an SUV 
for everyone, and if Americans prcdominandy drive SUVs, then Amer­
icans are collectively taking an exception.) In particular, economic sur­
plus that can make excepdons seem unnecessary is itself a giant, 
economy-size exception, I expect that the insistence that exceptions 
are unnecessary often marks a deep sense of entitlement that accom­
panies their being consumed unnoticed.
Let me Field one further worry before moving on. If the perturbed 
social world of the universalized Cl-maxim is one in which people act 
in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, then they will not lie, 
will lend a hand more frequently and with greater alacrity than is actu­
ally their wont, will have skills that make their assistance more effective 
than it now is, and so on. That world will be a much kinder and gentler 
place than ours, and even if exceptions are necessary for agency in our 
world, perhaps they will not be required in what we might as well call 
the Kingdom of Ends. But if they are not, then the contradiction in the 
will we have been pursuing is avoided.
Here we are really being asked to choose between two versions of the 
Cl-maxim, one of which has us take such effects into account (to pro­
duce what we can call a highly perturbed social world), and the other 
of which damps out the effects of the universalized maxim much more 
quickly {call its product the minimally perturbed social world). Recall 
that the point of the Cl-maxim (expressed in its final clause) is to deter­
mine whether some line of action that you are actually contemplating 
is permissible. But the highly perturbed social world is too distant from 
the actual world to allow you to assess the actions you must in feet con­
sider. Suppose that the maxim you are contemplating is: to Fill up your
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tank when you pass a gas station, so as not to run out of gas. Cars pre­
dictably kill and maim some non-negligible percentage of their passen­
gers, so in a Kantian choice of transportation system, automobiles 
would be prohibited; in the Kingdom of Ends, there are no cars. So you 
cannot turn to the Kingdom of Ends to answer questions about when 
to tank up. Appealing to the highly perturbing version of the Cl-maxim 
to determine what to do is adopting what is normally a self-frustrating 
plan of action: it amounts to either a contradiction in conception or 
something on a par with one.
3.
Until this point in the argument, New Kantians will find it easy to be 
concessive. It is hard not to allow that there are many cases where one 
needs what the man in the street calls an exception to the rule. But 
Kantians will have a complaint to register about the interpretation I 
have been putting on them: that they are exceptions in one sense, but 
not in another (and in particular, not in the sense my argument 
requires). Korsgaard has put the response in print, and so I will use her 
as my stalking horse; however, it is important to bear in mind that I am 
taking up her discussion notjust as an objecdon one could make to my 
argument, but as an instance of an objection New Kantians have to 
make: this is a forced move.
Korsgaard agrees that
there’s no general reason to suppose we can think of everything in 
advance. When we adopt a maxim as a universal law, we know there might 
be cases, cases we haven’t thought of, which would show us that it is not 
universal after all. In that sense we can allow far exceptions.^
The way she tries to accommodate this very pervasive fact is to allow 
that one’s principles “be willed ... as provisionally universal,” which is 
to say that we are to “think [a principle] applies to every case of a cer­
tain sort, unless there is some good reason why not.” She invokes the 
Kantian comparison to causal laws, and reminds us that when we make 
causal claims, we usually invoke causal principles that hold only “all 
else equal.” When we find an exception to a natural law, “we look for an 
explanation. Something must have made this case different: one of its 
background conditions was not met.”
Here the important point is that the explanation must itself have 
universal (or provisionally universal) force. For this reason, exceptions 
can be incorporated into laws that are universal in form; and this
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requirement {or the analogous requirement, since maxims really do 
differ from natural laws) in the practical case runs as follows:
if a principle was provisionally universal, and we encoun ter an excep­
tional case, we m ust now go back and  revise it, bringing it a little closer to 
the absolute universality to which provisional universality essentially 
aspires.
That is (and adjusting the terminology to bring it into line with the dis­
cussion so far), while (New) Kantians can allow that you may encounter 
cases that, you will agree, aren’t properly handled by whatever univer­
sally shaped maxim you had adopted, what you are to do is not, strictly 
speaking, to grant an exception, but to replace your old maxim with a 
new one that handles the “exception,” as it really ought to have been 
treated by the rule in the first place.30
This might be done by tacking the exception onto the maxim, as an 
extra clause, so to speak (one that you might not bother to mention the 
next time you state your maxim, but that is now understood to be part 
of it). Or you might reformulate the rule as a whole, so that separate 
mention of the class of exceptions wouldn’t be needed. There are 
many ways, some more and some less elegant, by which this might be 
accomplished.31 What they share is an adjustment in the contours of 
your practical commitments, and what matters is that while this adjust­
ment may be very sensidve to, and picky about, details, it too is univer­
sal in form: you are now committed to handling other similar cases in 
the same way.
Now Korsgaard thinks that “[t]he difference between regarding a 
principle as universal, and regarding it as provisionally universal, is 
marginal.” This, lam going to argue, is a mistake; the difference makes 
all the difference in the world, and especially in the world of the uni­
versalized Cl-maxim. There are two things to notice here: first, that 
making an excepdon and building an exception-shaped twiddle into a 
rule work differently in the social world; and second, that the commit­
ment to revise one’s maxim in such cases is itself a maxim, and has to 
be checked against the Cl-procedure as well.
4.
Recall the Kantian argument against lying: if lying in given circum­
stances was a practice, everyone would know that it was, and they would 
adjust their behavior in the light of that knowledge. (That is, no one 
would believe your lies, and you would never get that loan.) More gen­
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erally, when working our way through the Cl-procedure, we have to 
assume that others are going to adjust their plans of action in light of 
what the rules are. Recall that I left open the question of whether this 
was to be regarded as an empirical fact, to be retained in the world of 
a universalized maxim, or a prescriptive constraint—a matter of how 
Kantian moral theory requires us to think about our fellow persons. I 
do not want to resolve this question now, so I will try to use cases for 
which both versions of the constraint are plausible.
It follows that there is a difference between a genuine exception, 
and an adjustment to a rule that accommodates a previously unnoticed 
class of cases: when thinking about the latter, Kantian theory requires 
us to consider how people will adjust their plans in light of the modi­
fied rule. (People who grant exceptions sometimes worry about setting 
precedents; another way to characterize the effect that now has to be 
taken into account is that Kantian exceptions always set precedents.) 
Let’s return to our previous cases:
Parking in Milan Revisited. If everyone who needed to were allowed to 
leave his car in the lot with his blinkers on, people would soon nodce 
this option and start planning around it. They would count on being 
able to dash upstairs to make a phone call, or to deliver flowers, or 
whatever; and so they would plan on making that phone call or deliv­
ering the flowers. The parking lot would very quickly be full of briefly 
parked cars. The primary users of the lot would not be able to get in 
and out, and the visitor who needed an exception to the rule would 
generally find all the free spaces already taken. That is, what I needed 
to make my day work was an exception, and not an adjusted rule.
Trouble in High School Revisited. If it became the rule, roughly, that 
promising and bright high school students got to skip class with impu­
nity, they would soon realize that. An important incentive for attending 
classes would disappear, better students would stop coming to class, 
less promising students would be transformed into resentful second- 
class citizens, and the effect would be, not to help out bright and prom­
ising students (the intent of the original exception), but to undermine 
their academic performance. Again, what is needed is an exception, 
rather than a modification to the rule.
The Tardy Contributor Revisited: Likewise, if it were discovered that 
deadlines could be broken, contributors would quickly realize this. 
And in fact they have; some authors routinely overbook themselves, 
knowing that deadlines do not have to be taken seriously. (If you’re in 
the business, I don’t need to tell you who the egregious abusers are.)
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Any volume with a sizable number of contributors is bound to have one 
or more such authors, and since other authors know that the volume 
will be delayed, they too plan on dawdling. Since no one really believes 
the volume will have a timely appearance, authors reserve their best 
efforts for other venues. The point of granting the original exception 
was to facilitate the appearance of a strong and timely collection, which 
point is precisely undermined by universalizing the exception. Again, 
what is needed is an exception, rather than a modification to the rule.
More generally, because rational agents adjust their plans to take 
account of changes in the rules (because they, quite correctly, come to 
count on the new rules), institutionalizing exceptions—writing them 
into the rules in the way that Kantian moral theory requires—tends to 
have perverse results. The results are perverse in the ordinary sense, 
that of giving rise to baroque and unwanted side effects (think of the 
tax code, to take a bureaucratic example); but they are also perverse in 
a technical and Kantian sense, that of undercutting the connection 
between the exception and its originally intended effect. Usually, 
granting an exception while institutionalizing exceptions of that kind 
amounts to what is, by Kantian lights, a self-frustrating plan of action.
There are of course two sorts of cases: those in which universalizing 
an exception undermines the point of granting such an exception, and 
those in which it does not. New Kantian arguments for imperfect duties 
turn on judgment calls (about how much of an impediment to agency 
a given social phenomenon will turn out to be); my sense of the terri­
tory here is that you can’t get by just on the latter sort of exception s. But 
once again, if your sense of the territory differs, the backup claim is that 
such undermining happens to roughly the extent that you turn out to 
need help (and skilled help) from other people—that is, that if the 
New Kantian model arguments work, so does this one.
5.
Our first objection to treating maxims as “provisionally universal” was 
that there is a substantive difference between exceptions and changes 
in the rules, and often agents need the former rather than the latter. 
Our second objection is located on the side of the person dispensing 
exceptions, rather than on the side of the recipient. Kantian strategies 
need to be subjected to the Kantian consistency test. Accordingly, con­
sider the following second-order maxim:
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When I run into a case that my (first-order) maxim does not han­
dle properly, I will revise my (first-order) maxim to incorporate the 
exception, so as to be able to act on rules that I understand to be 
“provisionally universal."
Call this the Revision Maxim. If a Kantian is to find the Revision Maxim 
acceptable, it must pass the Cl-procedure; but there is a quick argu­
ment to show that it does not.
I have for expository convenience been speaking of agents adjusting 
themselves to changes in the rules, and recent Kantians may have 
found that turn of phrase worrisome; what we are supposed to be imag­
ining is not a response to change, but the steady-state social world of 
which the contrary-to-fact alteration is a permanent feature. (See, for 
example, Rawls 2000,171 f.) Now in the steady-state world where agents 
follow the Revision Maxim, most of their maxims will already be much- 
revised. That is to say, they will be very complicated (in something like 
the way the legal code or the tax code is complicated). But it is a deep 
empirical fact about human beings—a fact on a par with their vulner­
ability and the limitations on how many useful skills they can acquire— 
that they are not very good, cognitively, at handling this kind of com­
plexity and detail. It is very easy to swamp human cognitive resources, 
and in a world in which one’s maxims have had many exceptions 
appended to or integrated into them, they will be too complex to think 
with.
First, it will not be realistic to demand of agents that they be sensitive 
to whether their maxims are universalizable, because that will usually 
be too complicated a question for them to answer. The perturbed 
social world of the Cl-procedure is a complex abstract object, and you 
can think of it as beingalitde like a chessboard. Just as it is very easy to 
produce boards that are hard to see your way through (the starting 
state of the board is hard for anyone, including grandmasters and 
IBM’s Deep Blue; that’s why people play chess), so it is easy to produce 
perturbed social worlds it’s hard to see your way through. Adding detail 
to rules makes it harder to see, and see one’s way through, the structure 
of the perturbed social worlds they generate. (Compare the way the tax 
code evolves: policy makers fail to see that a provision they are intro­
ducing will create new loopholes, and that these will be exploited to the 
hilt; they then need to add further provisions, which in turn create fur­
ther loopholes; and so on. If human beings could generally see what 
the perturbed social world of a relatively complex rule looked like, they
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would be able to do so when the subject was taxation, and the tax code 
would not have the daunting patch-on-top-of-patch look that it does.) 
The point of the Revision Maxim is to allow one to act on rules that are 
universalizable; but in the world of the universalized Revision Maxim, 
one often cannot tell whether the maxim one proposes to act on is uni- 
versalizable.®~
Second, as maxims get more complicated, it becomes harder to see 
what actions they demand. (Think again of the tax code; who among 
us, accountants included, knows what taxes we should really be paying? 
If human beings could see what very complicated rules require, they 
could do it when the subject was taxes.) Again, the point of the Revision 
Maxim is to allow one to act on rules that are universalizable; but in the 
world of the universalized Revision Maxim, one often cannot so much 
as tell what one’s rule requires that one do. If this is right, the Revision 
Maxim fails the Cl-procedure (twice over) at the con trad iction-in-con- 
ception stage.33
Kant himself seems not to have appreciated the problem here; he 
apparendy thought that making out the demands of the Categorical 
Imperative, first formulation, was within the reach of even the simplest 
intelligence. Kant has not been alone. Widespread awareness of com­
plexity as an obstacle to problem solving dates only to the 1960s, and 
even now the idea has just barely become respectable within economics 
and political science.34 For instance, with occasional exceptions such 
as Hayek, the insuperable difficulties of managing centrally planned 
economies were overlooked until very late in the twentieth century 
(and it is suggestive that the construction of a Soviet-style Five Year Plan 
bears a family resemblance to the mapping out of perturbed social 
worlds that we are now contemplating) .3d If the realization that it is 
often not cognitively possible to solve problems about complicated 
social structures is still being assimilated in the social sciences, we 
should not blame Kant for not having noticed it.
You may be inclined to think that the complexity of the perturbed 
social worlds generated by the Cl-procedure cannot be as intractable as 
all that. After all, there are domains—such as producing syntactically 
correct speech—that seem to be quite complex and in which humans 
do quite well.36 And you may be wondering whether perhaps the Cl- 
procedure belongs in such a domain. To see why this is unlikely, con­
trast the almost effortless production of sentence after grammatical 
sentence (that gives the Chomskian hypothesis of a special-purpose 
hardwired grammar module whatever plausibility it has) with the pau­
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city of worked examples of the Cl-procedure. Earlier on, I added the 
New Kantian argument against violence to the three examples that 
canonically accompany presentations of the Categorical Imperative. 
Despite the fact that violence is a very basic moral issue, it took Kantians 
some two hundred years to come up with the argument, and it is 
treated, in the New Kantian literature, as a noteworthy achievement; it 
is, in any case, one of the very few new applications of the Cl-proce­
dure. If humans came to the problem space generated by the Cl-pro­
cedure possessing anything like their innate competence with the 
syntax of natural languages, then the solved problems would not be 
nearly so few and far between, and this particular application would 
have been merely one more of a practically endless stream of them.
Even if treating maxims as provisionally universal is unworkable, it 
might still be tempting to think that the pressure for exceptions can be 
relieved, in a way Kantians would welcome, by building generic excep­
tion clauses of one kind or another into the contents of maxims them­
selves. (For instance, unless an emergency comes up,” or . other 
things being equal," or “... unless an exception is needed.”) An argu­
ment of the kind we have just assembled disposes of these proposals. 
When it comes to “other things being equal," there are indefinitely 
many such cases that might come up, we cannot estimate their fre­
quency, and they do not lend themselves to being neatly classified in 
advance. So when maxims contain such clauses, it is impossible to tell 
what their perturbed social worlds will look like. For maxims that have 
had their contents blurred in this kind of way, the Cl-procedure does 
not give definite results. The point of adopting a second-order maxim 
that dictates generic exception clauses in one’s first-order maxims 
would be to rescue the Cl-procedure. So such a maxim founders on a 
contradiction in conception. This is why agents’ maxims have to be 
treated as laying down exceptionless policies.
To recap: First, modified rules differ from genuine exceptions, and 
they tend to be self-frustrating when universalized. Second, acting on 
the Revision Maxim is what New Kantian moral theory requires of 
agents who make exceptions, and the Revision Maxim fails the Cl-pro- 
cedure. This means that New Kantian moral theory cannot accommo­
date the need for exceptions. If Kantians cannot after all make 
exceptions, and if, as I have argued, exceptions are a necessary precon­
dition for successful agency worth the name, then the Cl-maxim does 
indeed give rise to a contradiction in the will.
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6.
Before concluding the paper, I want to take up two related objections 
to the argument we now have on the table. These try to abort it by cir­
cumscribing the application of the concept of a maxim. To frame the 
objections, I am going to take a moment to introduce another element 
of the New Kantian picture, which I will call maxim hierarchies.
The third clause of a maxim, as the New Kantians construe it, spec­
ifies the end or point of one’s action: to revert to an earlier example, 
“when I pass a gas station, to top off my tank, so as not to run out of gas." 
Now, that point can in general be understood as a further action or 
plan of action; the intent of that further plan of action can in turn be 
rendered by a maxim; and that further maxim will itself specify a fur­
ther point: perhaps, “when I am driving a car, not to let myself run out 
of gas, in order to keep my car a reliable means of transportation.” And like­
wise, that further point can be unfolded into a still-further maxim: 
maybe, “when I am in a location that does not have convenient and 
dependable public transit, to keep my car a reliable means of transpor­
tation, so that I can get where I need to go, when I need to be there." Maxims 
that appear at the upper reaches of such hierarchies tend to specify 
more abstract and more general policies (and I’ll sometimes talk about 
them as dictating “larger” actions, because they contain the actions 
specified by their inferiors in their hierarchies as subplans or compo­
nents) ,37 Such hierarchies turn up in the exposition of most New Kan­
tian positions,3® and they give a claim I made earlier the status of an 
observation: what counts, for present purposes, as action does not have 
to look busy', in particular, suitably governed omissions or refrainings 
can count as actions. In order to keep my car a reliable means of trans­
portation, I don’t strip the gears, (And so I don’t shift direcdy from 
fifth to first; I don’t shift into reverse while I’m speeding down the high­
way; and so on.) Not stripping the gears occupies a place in (another 
branch of) my maxim hierarchy, even though it, and many of the 
actions below it, are things I don’t do. (Recall, under this heading, that 
testing a general policy of not helping was the Kantian way of arguing 
for a duty of mutual aid.) For the purposes of practical reasoning, 
deliberatively governed plans of inaction are plans of action, too.
Now we can state the objections. First, at the upper reaches of such 
a hierarchy of intentions, there is a glass ceiling above which the poli­
cies are not to be considered maxims. In particular, being guided by 
the Cl-procedure need not be a maxim, and so such a policy does not
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itself need to be tested using the Cl-procedure. But if we exempt what 
we were calling the Cl-maxim (and similarly general or abstract poli­
cies, such as the Revision Maxim) from passing the Cl-procedure, then 
the argument we have just finished constructing will not go through. 
Since maxims were introduced as generic representations of the con­
tents of intentions or volitions, this amounts to saying that, while you 
are to act in conformity with the dictates of the Cl-procedure, this is not 
to be taken for a further intention on your part: in an older Kantian 
locution, you are to act in accord with, but not from, the moral law. Call 
this the Upper Glass Ceiling Objection.
The Upper Glass Ceiling Objection does not sound much like Kant, 
who is very concerned that one act, not merely in accord with, but out 
of respect for the moral law; Kant explicitly characterizes as a maxim an 
extremely general and abstract policy, “that I should follow such a law 
even if all my inclinations are thereby thwarted” (G 400); he also wor­
ries about how maxim hierarchies are going to top out, treating the 
Categorical Imperative as one of the possible basic postures an agent 
might assume.39 So the Upper Glass Ceiling Objection would have to 
be understood not as an explication of Kant, but as an amendment to 
him. Now, the Cl-procedure is motivated by the idea that it is important 
to assess, not your actions on their own, but why you do them; if you did 
not think that what mattered was the practical consistency of the voli­
tion, rather than the outcome effected by the volition, there would be 
no point to deploying the Cl-procedure in the first place. So it’s hard 
to see why someone who cared only about conformity of reasons and 
rationality to some template would end up requiring this pattern to be 
conformed to in one’s mode of producing action. That is, the move 
made by the Upper Glass Ceiling Objection is evidently motivated not 
by considerations that have their home in the (New) Kantian way of 
seeing things, but as an ad hoc response to the problem posed by our 
argument. Of course, that is not yet reason enough to dismiss it.
Second, it will be suggested that what we find at the lower reaches of 
the hierarchy are not, properly speaking, maxims. Only suitably gen­
eral principles, such as those mandating or prohibiting lying, are sub­
ject to test by the Cl-procedure; “specific intentions” are not,40 and so 
need not be exceptionless. Since the argument we have been con­
structing turns on the pervasiveness of needed but unavailable excep­
tions, if a glass ceiling below which maxims are not to be found is set 
suitably high, then the argument will not go through. Call this the 
Lower Glass Ceiling Objection.
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The Lower Glass Ceiling Objection requires a Kantian willing to 
make a difficult sacrifice, Hegel complained that Kantian universaliz- 
ability was too formal a device actually to produce substantive results, 
and the New Kantian tradition takes visible pride in having shown how 
a recognizably Kantian rendering of the Categorical Imperative can 
indeed produce conclusions as concrete as those we have reviewed. But 
the further up the Lower Glass Ceiling is set, the fewer substantive 
results there will be. Moreover, this New Kantian rejoinder puts a great 
deal of pressure on the notion of a maxim. If maxims are not simply a 
way to capture the form of any intentional action whatsoever, we need 
to be told what they are. And looking more closely at this lacuna gives 
us a decisive response to both the Upper and Lower Glass Ceiling 
Objections.
Recall the structure of Kantian imperfect duties. No one can help 
everyone who needs it, and there is no way of marking off just those 
cases in which you really have to help out from those in which you 
don’t. So it is up to you to decide when to help out; in the end, when 
to help is your judgment call. Now, it is not as though we have a prin­
cipled way to place what I was calling the Upper and Lower Glass Ceil­
ings; after all, what is the hard and fast difference between maxims, 
more specific intentions, and more general policies? The Cl-procedure 
applies only to what counts as a maxim, so the Glass Ceiling Objections 
give the moral law the structure of an imperfect duty: they entail grant­
ing to agents the discretion to decide when to invoke the Cl-procedure 
as a constraint on their actions. (So an agent might insist, entirely legit­
imately, that lying was permissible because, in his judgment, the inten­
tion to lie was either too specific or too general to count as a maxim.) 
The effect would be to erase the distinction between perfect and 
imperfect duties from New Kantian moral theory, I am confident that 
the New Kantians would regard that consequence as unwelcome and 
unacceptable.41
New Kantians tend to allow that maxims can be very general and 
abstract.42 But some New Kantians already think that intentions at the 
lower regions o f the hierarchy cannot in any case count as maxims. So 
is my objection to Lower Glass Ceilings uncharitable?43 In my view, 
New Kantians face a hard choice, and here is how I think it looks.
When running a maxim through the Cl-procedure produces a star­
tling result, there is an unfortunate inclination on the part of Kantian 
theorists to try to block the result by insisting that the input was not 
really a maxim in the first place.44 I am for my own part disappointed
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by how frequently that inclination wins out. Kantian theory is deep and 
interesting only when it is taken seriously, and I have found that facing 
up to the startling result is usually theoretically fruitful. Just for 
instance, the maxim, “I will buy clockwork trains but not sell them,” 
does not universalize: if no one sells the trains, no one will able to buy 
them (Nell 1975, 76). The moral really is that that intention is imper­
missible. (Morality requires more carefully conditionalized maxims, 
perhaps ones that are explicitly sensitive to the idea that being a toy col­
lector is only one of the many social roles you might contingently 
occupy.) Or again, it’s a standard classroom example that maxims like 
“I will turn up at Times Square tomorrow” don’t universalize. (There’s 
not enough room for everyone.) The moral here is that introducing 
proper names into maxims produces contradictions in conception. Or 
again, Herman’s example of a “puzzle maxim” that must be “set aside” 
is, “To always be first through the door.” I disagree: the fact that this 
maxim is not universalizable is a very good candidate explanation for 
the fact that this sort of pushiness is, while not a big deal, nonetheless 
rude. That is, one option for the New Kantians (and the one that seems 
to me likeliest to produce richer results) is not to give up so easily on 
the intentions at the bottom of the hierarchy (but this means giving up 
on the Lower Glass Ceiling Objection).
A second option is to find a principled way of distinguishing the 
maxims to which the Cl-procedure applies from the more concrete 
intentions to which it does not. This seems less promising to me. One 
reason is that no one who has tried to introduce the distinction has 
made much headway at cleanly articulating it. Another is that the New 
Kantian tradition has seen the Cl-procedure as a test of practical con­
sistency. That way of motivating the Cl-procedure makes sense when its 
range of application is intention, generically understood. But what 
kind of distinction could support a more narrow notion of consistency? 
And why should practical consistency be required only of some special 
type of intention?45
The third option is to allow perfect duties to vanish from New Kan­
tian moral theory, and the centrality to the tradition of the perfect 
duties makes this tantamount to altering the content of Kantian moral 
theory almost beyond recognition. But if New Kantians cannot afford 
glass ceilings, then they are committed to maxims coming in all 
degrees of generality and abstraction. The New Kantian position may 
require that maxims share a shape—the logical form that is used to 
express the content of an intention that comes up to snuff—but their
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shape cannot constrain the level of abstractness of the maxim’s con* 
tent. And this is (one more reason) why I have been using the looser 
‘point’ to describe what the third slot of New Kantian maxims 
expresses; some people are finicky about the term ‘end’, and prefer to 
use it only for fairly concrete aims with definite termination points. But 
this notion of end is much narrower than what maxims must be able to 
capture.
7.
What lesson should we draw from the argument that we have just con­
cluded? Not the easy one, that we should give up on New Kantian moral 
theory. True, if con trad iction-in-the-will arguments establish imperfect 
duties, it looks as though we have exhibited a Kantian imperfect duty to 
violate the Categorical Imperative, and so that part of the position will 
have to go. But New Kantian moral theory would not have gotten 
nearly the attention it has if it were so intellectually impoverished as to 
be a one-idea view. I mentioned at the outset two other ideas tradition­
ally identified with Kant (the requirement that persons be treated as 
“ends in themselves,” and the importance of autonomy), but there are 
many more: just for instance, the conception ofpersonhood as a prac­
tical rather than a metaphysical status, ingenious arguments against 
instrumentalist accounts of practical reasoning, and the suggestion 
that actions are to be thought o f as moves in the only game in town. 
(See Korsgaard 1996a, chaps. 13,11, Schapiro2001.) Showing that one 
of the ideas in the Kantian portfolio is unworkable leaves a valuable 
and still-diversified grouping of philosophical assets. (And in fact some 
New Kantians have over the past decades come to rest more weight on 
the so-called Formula o f Humanity in particular.)
It is also too early to go looking for constructive lessons about prac­
tical reasoning and morality—the kind of lessons that would help us 
frame improved accounts of one or the other. We ought first to 
develop a deeper diagnosis of what has gone wrong with the Categori­
cal Imperative, first formulation; but to come by that, we will need a 
better handle on the philosophical motivations of the New Kantian 
position than we now have, starting with an explanation of why an 
agentwills the universalization of his maxim (so that the contradictions 
exhibited by the Cl-procedure are contradictions in the agent’s will). I 
do not think this question can be successfully pursued without turning
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from the New Kantians back to Kant himself, and that is an undertak­
ing for another time and place.
So allow me to suggest an interim and methodological lesson. When 
you are working up your philosophical theory, always stop to check 
what happens when you apply that theory to itself. Sometimes that 
operation will not so much as make sense. Sometimes the result will be 
fast and reassuring. But sometimes, as we have just seen, it will not, and 
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1 Rawls 1989 is an overview that appropriates the position it attributes to 
Kant as a precursor o f Rawls’s own constructivist political theory; Rawls 2000 
makes available his very influential lectures. It should not be assumed that the 
influence was all one-way; over the years, his presentation o f Kant assimilated 
much of the work he had delegated to his students.
Nell 1975 focuses on laying out the Kantian deliberative procedure, pro­
viding a m uch less terse rendering o f the view set out in  O ’Neill 1989, chap. 5 
(and m ore generally th roughout the volume). Korsgaard 1990 accepts 
O’Neill’s account of the procedure and focuses on motivating it; Korsgaard 
1996a develops a range o f Kantian positions around the motivated procedure, 
and is now probably the center o f gravity o f this reading. While H erm an 1993 
advances the interpretation, it also breaks ranks on a num ber o f points, and  in 
section 6 I will discuss the reasons H erm an’s views diverge from others in  the 
group.
I will not tie myself too tighdy to  the nuances of any version o f the New 
Kantian view; I mean my sketch o f it to represent the shared structure fairly, 
but 1 do not want to imply that the fine prin t is attributable to  each and every 
instance o f the class, I will flag im portant disagreem ents as I go, as well as 
descriptions o f their view that New Kantians would themselves find controver­
sial o r prejudicial,
2 From G 421, with grammatical modifications. I will cite Kant’s works 
using the following abbreviations, in  the translations following the tide: G: 
Grounding for the Metaphysics ofMorals (1785/1981); A /B: Critique of Pure Reason, 
giving the pagination for the A and B editions (1781/1787/1998); C2: Critique 
of Practical Reason (1788/1997); DV: Doctrine of Virtue (Metaphysics ofMorah, sec­
ond part) (1797/1994); R: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793/ 
1998),With the exception of the first Critique, paginadon will be that o f the 
standard Academy edition o f Kant’s works (1902-).
H erm an 1990, 150f,, 188, provides a useful compilation of the different 
formulations o f the Categorical Imperative.
3 Despite the step-by-step presentation and occasional rem arks by the 
authors we are considering (Herm an 1993, 115, calls it an “algorithm ”), the 
Cl-procedure is n o t technically a procedure o r algorithm. Procedures can be 
executed mechanically and are guaranteed to term inate; inspecting the steps 
in this one will show that neither is true o f it; Rawls 2000, 166, acknowledges 
this point, as does Nell 1975, 73. Rawls’s own work progressively distanced 
itself from the idea that the central problem s o f political theory could be ren­
dered as well-defined exercises in game theory, and I suspect that the “proce­
dure” terminology is a holdover from  an earlier stage in his development.
4 Rawls adds a  fourth “unless" slot that we can understand to be included in
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C (2000,168). Kant and  the majority of the New Kantians think o f the point o f 
the action as its end; Kant in  particular holds it to be a formal fact about 
actions th a t they have identifiable ends (C2 34, DV 382-85). I am being looser 
about this partly to accom m odate H erm an (1993, 221), who quite plausibly 
insists that the full desirability characterization of an action is to be repre­
sented in its maxim, and partly for reasons I will get to in due course,
5 I’m fram ing the condition disjunctively because it’s n o t always clear or 
agreed am ong the New Kantians which disjunct the test pivots on. See Nell 
1975, 69ff;. H erm an 1993, 118; Korsgaard 1996a, chap. 3, esp. sect. 3; Rawls 
2000,169; O ’Neill 1989, 96.
B H erm an is som ething o f an exception; see note 45, below.
7G 421 n., DV 390, 392-94. I don’t here want to take up  the question of 
how plausibly the perfec t/im perfect distinction can be tied to the step at 
which the Cl-procedure is exited. For a New Kantian review o f exegetical con­
troversies having to do with this distinction, see Nell 1975, chap. 4.
8 The poin t now is n o t that a practice that is unsuccessful for this kind of 
reason will be replaced by a  different practice. As a m atter of fact, we m ore or 
less live in the world Kant describes, where people lie to get loans as a m atter 
o f course. That is why loans are not made on the basis o f such promises. Mort­
gage originators do n o t stay in business by trusting their customers; they make 
sure there is collateral to foreclose on.
 ^Closer to hom e, letters o f recom m endation for the academic jo b  m arket 
are ano ther case where, for the most part, the discounting doesn’t go nearly 
deep enough. “His dissertation will certainly change the field he is in.” “She is 
the best student who has ever com e through ou r program .” “T he work he has 
done as a graduate student would make a  successful case for tenure." Sound 
familiar?
Because Kant predates the twentieth-century repudiation of psycholo­
gism, claims with prescriptive force are often presented in his work as descrip­
tions o f an idealized mind. For some discussion, see A nderson 2001.
Presentations of the Cl-procedure usually include a gloss to roughly the 
effect that in constructing your representation o f the perturbed social world 
you are to keep as m uch as possible o f the world as we know it intact. This is 
analogous to the way we reason about contrary-to-fact conditionals; when ask­
ing “W hat would have happened  if p?" we imagine as m uch as possible o f the 
background to rem ain as is. We have ju s t seen that it is still an open question 
w hether this is the appropriate understanding; however, see also the final 
objection in section 2, below.
11 Is it really conceivable? Perhaps not; a fem inist objection to Hobbesian 
state-of-nature argum ents is that hum an beings are too vulnerable actually to 
grow up o r live in such a world (Vogler 1995).
*2 Again, this could be taken as an em pirical claim, o r as prescriptive, about 
how your choice has to look “from  the practical po in t o f view." (For develop­
m ent o f this latter idea, see Bok 1998.) T he prescription can be motivated by 
a specifically moral thought such as: ju st as you have to respect others, by leav­
ing them  space to adop t a reasonable range o f ends, so you have to respect 
yourself, and  not allow that range of ends to  be foreclosed to you. The price of
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this kind o f motivation, however, would be building explicitly moral consider­
ations into the conception o f practical rationality at the core o f the theory, 
(I’m grateful to Geoff Say re-McCord for discussion here.)
13 Again, is it really? It is suggestive that, while Kant seems to have thought 
that the no-talent maxim guided the way life was lived in  the South Pacific, no 
actual hum an society has ever operated on this basis.
14 This particular argum ent may not seem m uch like Kant’s (somewhat 
obscure) text, but it is a New Kantian way o f handling  the case; see O ’Neill 
1989, 99. Kant does rem ind us that parents try to have their children develop 
a range o f skills that will serve whatever ends they adopt down the road 
(G 415).
13 For a reconstruction o f the argum ent that there must be “broad obliga­
tions,” that is, im perfect duties, see O 'Neill 1989, 230. The argum ent turns on 
the claim that one does not have available principled ways o f delim iting o n e’s 
obligation m ore tightly. Kant provides a  subsidiary argum ent to  support this 
observation that is, however, less plausible than the observation itself is: any 
further argum ent would establish a different g round  o f obligation. (DV 403; 
com pare A787f./B815f.)
16 Loosely adapted from H erm an 1993, chap. 6; com pare Korsgaard 1996a, 
98-100, Nell 1975, 79f.
17And m ore generally, as Cindy Stark has rem inded me, not all violence is 
an im pedim ent to  agency; The Fight Club is a recen t film whose eponymous 
institution can serve as an example.
18 W hether this argum ent is to  be understood as invoking a contradiction in 
conception o r a contradiction in the will depends on how contradiction in 
conception is understood (see note 5, above), and on whether the form er or 
the latter o f these problem s is being em phasized. H erm an presents it as invok­
ing your stake in  your own agency generally, and so as exploiting a contradic­
tion in the will; on that reading, the duty not to avail oneself o f violent means 
would be im perfect. I want to leave to one side here the question o f whether 
we should be happy with an argum ent that makes abjuring violence o u t to be 
an im perfect duty; what does m atter is that the argum ent is endorsed by sev­
eral New Kantians, being treated by them— and this is a  point for which I will 
have a  use later on—as som ething o f an accomplishment.
19H erm an (1993 53f.) gives an argum ent m eant to block the following 
objection: that you can avoid contradictions in the will by deciding to adopt 
only projects guaranteed not to require resources provided by m utual aid, o th­
ers’ talents, and so on.
20 I’ll provide argum ents for these claims, as well as an explication o f what is 
m eant by the "size” o f an action, in section 6.
21 T here are o ther possible final clauses for the Cl-maxim, for instance, “out 
o f respect for the moral law.” T hat would express the po in t o f the action, but 
not perhaps an end. (1 say “perhaps,” because while such respect is not any­
thing like a goal, Kant redescribes respect for persons as treating them  as 
"ends in themselves,” and persons are not, except in pathological cases, any­
thing like goals either; possibly the right gloss on  Kant’s term  “en d ” would 
make an end  of respect for the m oral law.) A nother alternative final clause
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m ight be “to prom ote the H ighest Good”; I take it that the H ighest Good is 
best understood as occupying the role, in Kant’s account, o f the formal end 
(but o f course not the determ ining ground) o f  moral and  rational action-in- 
general. For present purposes, however, it does not much m atter what the 
final clause o f the Cl-maxim is taken to be, because final clauses do work at the 
contradiction-in-conception phase of the Cl-procedure, and n o t at the contra- 
diction-in-the-will stage. The argum ent I am about to construct will n o t need 
to dem onstrate a  contradiction in conception.
® Taking seriously the requirem ent that the Cl-procedure is self-endorsing 
conforms to the approach taken by New Kantian metaethics. Korsgaard, for 
instance, extracts from a historical survey the lesson that self-endorsement is 
the only possible source o f normativity; she subsequently generalizes the first- 
cut requirem ent, o f a faculty’s endorsing itself, to the general endorsem ent of 
all o f o n e’s faculties by all o n e ’s faculties (Korsgaard 1996b, 62, 65f.). O n both 
the less and the m ore stringent versions o f the view, a faculty’s flunking itself 
out should strip the normativity from its pronouncem ents.
23 Need the sort of maxim we have in m ind be foundational? Perhaps you 
have some reason for a proposal as im portant as: always acting on the moral 
law (respect for persons, o r a deep com m itm ent to some set o f values; see note 
45), And normally, when you get around to running  a  maxim through the Cl- 
procedure, you already think the course of action it proposes is a good idea, 
for some reason or other. But Kant himself seems to have thought that adher­
ence to the Categorical Imperative could have no further ground; see note 39, 
below. T hat said, I don ’t think we have to settle the question here.
24Com pare O 'Neill 1989, 129f. But how could Kant have held both this 
view and accorded the im portance that he d id  to im perfect duties? I think 
there really is a  deep tension in his view here, b u t the parts of it that are on  dis­
play are formally compatible. The im perfect duties are given as mandatory 
ends, not as maxims. Acting to  prom ote a m andatory end  requires formulat­
ing a m ore structured intention—a maxim— that specifies what, on a specified 
class of occasions, you will do to  prom ote the end. (The class o f occasions you 
specify may not exhaust the occasions on which you will, in one way or 
another, act to  prom ote the end; those fu rther occasions will have to be cov­
ered by o ther maxims.) Your maxim will then  have to be checked for permis­
sibility, using the universalizability test. For instance, to  develop my talents is a 
m andatory end, b u t not yet a maxim. W hen I consider developing my talents 
by robbing banks, I now have a maxim, but this maxim fails at the contradic- 
tion-in-conception stage o f the Cl-procedure. {If everybody robbed banks, 
there would be no banks to  rob.) So although I m ust find ways to develop my 
talents, I may n o t do it by robbing banks.
35 Rawls tries to deal with a related objection—th a t moral restrictions will 
also get in  the way o f plans you may have—by appealing to a special class of 
interests, which he calls “true hum an needs”; the idea is that these are tied to 
different kinds o f obstacles to  agency (Rawls 2000, 173f.; such needs are an 
exegetical adaptation o f his own notion of “primary goods"). So note that I am 
constructing the argum ent so th a t there is no plausible difference o f this kind 
to  which to appeal.
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36 Kant him self had been influenced by the Leibnizian tradition, and so 
there is some plausibility to a reading o f the text on which permissible actions 
turn out to be unique and so required, and on which Kant’s vision o f the king­
dom o f ends is rem iniscent of Leibnizian preestablished harmony. For now, 
we can say that the New Kantians find this sort of rigorism uncongenial, both 
because it is not in keeping with the Zeitgeist, and because the po in t o f their 
project is to reclaim Kant as a predecessor to  Rawlsian liberalism, a  position 
that tries to maximize, rather than maximally constrict, freedom  o f action. We 
will provide a m ore principled reason for n o t falling back on rigorism below.
Over and  above that, you m ight be worried that your needing an excep­
tion shows that you did not have a (by Kantian lights) coherent in tention in 
the first place. But since we cannot anticipate the exceptions our projects will 
require, insisting that a project is coherently in tended  only if it will not require 
exceptions would unacceptably underm ine agency.
28 G 423; we can imagine som eone wealthy enough to pay for all the help he 
needs.
29 Korsgaard 1999, 25, my emphasis. Quotations below are from  pages 24­
25 o f this same paper.
30 Com pare Hill 1992, a  paper whose title announces its subject to be a Kan­
tian treatm ent of exceptions, and which turns out to be an attem pt to work up 
m ore nuanced reasons for m ore nuanced— but formally universal and excep­
tionless—policies (in this case, “policies that involve taking the lives o f terror­
ists,” and possibly bystanders).
One option that I have had  suggested to me is that the burden be taken 
up by an Aristotelian sensitivity to when exceptions are called for, (That is, the 
more complex policy is to be im plem ented partly as the original, explicitly 
stated, but less complicated policy, and partly as a  disposition to notice the 
specified classes o f exception when they com e up; H erm an’s “rules o f moral 
salience” are a New Kantian attem pt to integrate such patterns o f attention 
and recall into the Kantian apparatus.) W hat m atters for present purposes— 
and the reader should verify this as we walk through the argum ent— is that 
how the m ore com plex rule is im plem ented makes no difference, first, to its 
social effects, and  second, to the cognitive burden (computational and other­
wise) involved in following it.
Why can’t the problem  be solved by integrating the accum ulating excep­
tions into cleanly form ulated rules? After all, som ething like this goes on in the 
sciences; why not in ethics?
I think that the accretion of detail outpaces our ability to identify simpli­
fying patterns; tha t’s visibly true o f such examples as the tax code. I t’s true in 
the sciences as well, and some philosophers of science, like Cartwright (1983), 
argue that the simplicity of the laws is consequendy purchased at the expense 
of their truth. And there is a fu rther obstacle in ethics. Recall that maxims 
have to capture the motivations the agent actually has. Those motivations are 
normally tied to a specific conceptual apparatus. Now, what we learn from  the 
history o f such simplifications in  the sciences is that they are accom panied by 
fairly radical conceptual shifts. But we can insist on  deploying a new set o f con­
cepts in on e’s maxims only if they can summ on up corresponding motiva­
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tional structure. As a m atter o f sociological feet, change in such concept- 
em bedding motivations is very slow. So once again, we should expect the p ro ­
cess of practical simplification to fall ever farther behind the accretion o f legit­
imate exceptions to our rules. (For example, an  anti-Semitic maxim will 
express a motivation tied to the concept “Jew.” T hat means that we can 't effect 
the gestalt o r paradigm shifts that would render o u r maxims less complicated, 
when those shifts would involve replacing the concept “Jew," if we can’t get rid 
o f the anti-Semitism.)
33 You may be inclined to look for m ore restricted versions o f either the Cl- 
maxim o r the Revision Maxim; in that case, notice where the strategy lands 
you. The Kantian account needs machinery to  prevent tailored versions of 
intentions to lie, cheat and  steal from slipping through  the C l-procedure. (See 
note 38, below, for a terse recapitulation o f the problem .) So a restricted ver­
sion of, say, the Revision Maxim needs to com e with a  motivated account o f the 
machinery, and  an argum ent dem onstrating how, in  light o f that account, pro­
posed revisions to  the Revision Maxim are not blocked (even though unac­
ceptable revisions to lying maxims and their ilk are). 1 d o n 't have a tight 
argum ent showing that no  such proposal can work—that’s because it’s hard to 
have a good enough sense o f the range o f possible proposals ahead of time—  
but I have no reason to expect that any will.
34 Ben do r 2003 reviews the history of (and obstacles to) the reception, in 
political science, of the m ethodological suggestion that hum an cognitive limi­
tations need  to  be taken into account in theory construction.
C om puter science has a well-established m athem atical subdiscipline that 
studies com putational complexity, and novice com puter scientists are taught 
that intractability is ubiquitous. But it is rem arkable that, half a century ago, as 
distinguished a founder o f that discipline as Alan Turing (1950) could be 
quite certain that a  program  exhibiting intelligence would run  on the hard­
ware available in  his day—that is, on what was, by our lights, scarcely a pocket 
calculator.
35See, for instance, Hayek 1989, at 143f., 149f., Hayek 1948, chaps. 2, 4, 7­
9. Invisible-hand capitalists have taken to gloating over the vindication of 
Hayek’s attack on socialism, but they may well have very similar problems; 
there is a growing body o f evidence that m arket clearing is often a com puta­
tionally intractable problem .
We can now give the principled response to the rigorist rejoinder 
broached in  note 26. Even if there is a  unique equilibrium  poin t in  the game 
of policy selection (and o f course we have no p roof that there is), we have no 
reason to  believe that it is computationally accessible. If it is not, then  it is not 
for practical purposes a solution at all. From the standpoint o f practical rea­
soning, a solution that it is in principle impossible to produce is irrelevant.
36 Some domains may look to be complicated, b u t be question-begging if 
used as counterexamples. I am  arguing that hum ans have to negotiate their 
environm ents by deploying exceptions, rather than  com plicated rules. So one 
should n o t slide from thinking that, say, etiquette looks tricky, to thinking 
that, because tricky problem s have to be handled  by complicated rules, it dis­
plays a hum an ability to deploy com plicated rules. In fact, etiquette is tricky
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mostly because exceptions require a good deal o f delicacy and  judgm ent.
Recall that the Cl-procedure is m eant as a rational reconstruction. That 
means that we do n o t have to walk through the procedure aloud, before each 
action, but we must still possess the cognitive abilities needed to underwrite 
sensitivity to its dictates. Analogously, we do not write out parse trees before we 
u tter sentences, b u t the gramm atical complexity o f the sentences we produce 
is lim ited by our cognitive capacities.
37 Members o f a maxim hierarchy are related to one another roughly as the 
answers to  Anscom be’s famous series o f “Why?"-questions (1985, sect. 23); for 
work in the Anscombian tradition that takes up the ways in which “larger" 
actions em bed and  justify “smaller” actions, see Vogler 2003.
38 In H erm an, they are p rom inent as a partial solution to the so-called Prob­
lem o f Relevant Descriptions. It is a familiar point that whether or n o t the Cl- 
procedure rules any actions (as opposed to  maxims) out o f o rder depends on 
how m uch flexibility there is in selecting a maxim to test. Actions have indefi­
nitely many descriptions, and one can always find a description o f an action 
that really could be m ade the rule: lying may not be universalizable, but lying 
only to the naive and clueless probably is universalizable.
Herm an has realized that the requirem ent that what is checked be the 
psychologically actual in tention underlying the contem plated action, and not 
ju s t any old description o f it, will not produce a recognizably moral pattern  of 
permissions (and, m ore im portant from a theoretical point of view, an  orderly 
pattern) if agents’ psychologies are sufficiently idiosyncratic. If the peculiarly 
tailored maxim (the one that slips past the Cl-procedure) really does express 
your intent, then  the Cl-procedure will tell you that you can go ahead with it. 
The problem  is not ju st that the Cl-procedure usefully regulates only those 
with already very standard patterns o f motivation, while giving the strange and 
the psychopathic carte blanche. It is that necessary but entirely unaccounted-for 
regim entation of agents’ motivational structure has becom e the engine o f the 
theory. This would am ount to  failure o f the New Kantian theoretical enter­
prise, and H erm an has devoted m uch thought and ingenuity to forestalling it 
(1993, esp. chap. 4; chap. 7, sect. 4; chap. 3, sect. 3.)
Maxim hierarchies can be used to provide a certain am ount o f anchoring 
against the tides o f agential idiosyncrasy, because, for any given maxim that 
itself passes the Cl-procedure, one can still test its superiors and  inferiors in 
the hierarchy, (Som ething like this move can also be found in O ’Neil 1989, 87, 
where “specific intentions” tu rn  out to be “ancillary to m ore fundam ental 
intentions vr principles that m ight indeed have revealed moral unworthiness in 
the agent.”) However, perhaps maxim hierarchies do  not solve the Problem of 
Relevant Descriptions on  their own; for all it has been argued, an agent could 
be thoroughly perverse, all the way up his casuistical hierarchy, in a m anner 
that would slip through the Cl-procedure.
Kant does give a quick argum ent that looks like it should be working as a 
reductio, but that he claims instead establishes that “the first subjective 
ground o f the adoption of m oral maxims is inscrutable” (R 21, and  esp. 21 n.). 
T he problem  is that the ground o f the free adoption of a  maxim must be 
sought, n o t in  any incentive o f nature, but in a further (freely adopted)
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maxim; this generates a regress o f maxims; b u t since hum ans have small-finite 
psychologies, they cannot support such a regress; their psychologically avail­
able reasons will bottom  out, if  you keep pressing, in a brute natural fact {typ­
ically an impulse o r inclination).
In my view the best way to accom m odate this tension is not to take refuge 
in “inscrutability," b u t to  regard the dem and that leads to em bedding maxims 
in a hierarchy as ju s t that: a dem and, to m ake the effort to articulate o n e’s 
motivations fu rther when that is appropriate.
40 The phrase is from  O ’Neill 1989, 87: “[i]f in welcoming my visitor with a 
cup o f coffee I intentionally select a particular cup, my specific intention 
clearly cannot be universally acted on.” H er distinction between “specific 
intentions" and “maxims” is in tended  to  get you o u t o f having to have such 
choices approved by the Cl-procedure. See also h e r note 6 on that page, and 
112, note 2.
41 New Kantians are com fortable with judgm en t calls in the application of 
maxims; see, for instance, Nell 1975, 37. But they see that as a very different 
matter, having to do with the fringes o f the theory, and not with its overall 
structure.
H erm an allows that “the maxims K ant uses are at all levels o f generality" 
(1993, 220f.; she thinks her own account o f maxims to be “unorthodox”). 
Korsgaard rem inds us approvingly that “Kant proposes that we can tell 
w hether our maxims should be laws by attending not to their m atter b u t to 
their form " (1996b, 107), to  which we can add that the size o f a  maxim is a m at­
ter of its m atter and  n o t o f its form.
43O ’Neill thinks o f maxims as “underlying [practical] principles” (1989, 
84f.), to be contrasted with both “aspects o f action that are ‘below the level of 
in ten tion ,’" and “our m ore specific intentions"; see 129, 151f., 158. In h er ear­
lier writing, the issue is “the am ount o f detail about an agent’s circumstances 
and his proposed act which can be included in his maxims" (1975, 37).
44 N ot always: O ’Neill suggests getting out of a class o f hard  cases not by 
refusing the title o f maxim, but by simply waiving the test provided by the Cl 
(1975, 76f.). H erm an announces that “ [e]ach in terpreter of the Cl must 
develop ways to  set aside the puzzle maxims" (1993, 225).
45 In the course o f h e r efforts to address the Problem  o f Relevant Descrip­
tions, Herm an has endorsed reversing the characteristically Kantian priority o f 
deliberative procedure to value, so as to  let values underwrite and control the 
procedure (see H erm an 1993, 153f., and  com pare C2 63); and you might 
think that some such appeal to values could be used to address the difficulties 
raised by the argum ent we have been developing, H erm an has come to see the 
Cl-procedure as expressing respect for persons (or “ends-in-themselves”) , and 
this alternative way of motivating the Cl-procedure allows one to forgo think­
ing of it as a consistency test. Making that move opens up the possibility o f 
restricting the applicability o f the Cl-procedure, because an  in tention or pol­
icy (such as the policy o f acting in  accord with the Cl-procedure) will no 
longer have to be considered practically inconsistent if it fails to pass the Cl- 
procedure. (However, the alternative motivation does not fix what I claimed 
above was the decisive rejoinder to the Glass Ceiling Objections.)
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This is radical surgery on the Kantian position that I hope can in the end 
be avoided, if only because it would make Kantian moral theory m uch less 
deep, and m uch less interesting, than it has the prom ise of being. To see how 
radical, recall the Kantian com m itm ent to autonom y over heteronomy, and 
recall that w hether one is autonomously or heteronom ously related to o n e ’s 
evaluations is a m atter of how they are accepted, and  not a m atter o f their con­
tent. In principle, on e’s acceptance even of the im portance of autonomy, or o f 
the value of persons, could be heteronom ous (for instance, if one believed 
that autonom y was supremely valuable because an authority had said so ). Now, 
in H erm an’s revision o f K ant’s views, it is the value o f persons and o f auton­
omy that com e first, and  that underw rite allegience to the Categorical Imper­
ative. So H erm an is advocating a “Kantian” position on which one is to be 
heteronom ous with respect to o n e’s deepest and morally most central commit­
ments.
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